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A b s t r a c t  This article indentifies the carbon governance 
landscape after a complex and large-scale disaster by identi- 
fying the formation of new strategic groups and the utilization 
of resources policies. The article highlights the post-disaster 
context of land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF). 
In particular it examines the power issue surrounding carbon 
management in Aceh Province, Indonesia, after the Indian 
Ocean tsunami (lOT) 2004. The author proposes a new 
institutional framework, namely the Strategic Framework for 
Sustainability Analysis (SFSA). The SFSA uses a series of 
strategic group analyses, combined with strategic resources 
identification and strategic policy to analyze LULUCF prob- 
lems. The strategic groups in LULUCF are those that hold the 
decision-making power to discourage/encourage sustainabil- 
ity of local natural resources. Each group is assumed to 
reposition itself strategically in order to gain more control over 
resources. The lOT 2004 has led Aceh to exercise its own 
sustainability policies, which are set through many initiatives 
such as a moratorium on logging, a sustainable palm oil policy, 
livelihood-based carbon conservation projects, and green 
development policies, including disaster risk reduction. 
K e y w o r d s  carbon governance, Indian Ocean Tsunami, 
LULUCF, strategic groups, sustainability 
1 Introduction 
Carbon management through LULUCF in Aceh Province, the 
westernmost province of Indonesia, remains complex. The 
large-scale reconstruction efforts since the IOT coupled with 
the legacy of a long standing civil war and persistent poverty 
makes sustainable natural resource management challenging. 
This is especially the case when local institutions are too 
weak to set a sustainable development policy, a problem 
exacerbated by the IOT catastrophe. 
One particular environmental problem is the huge demand 
in timber consumption for reconstruction after the IOT. 
Recent data indicate that illegal logging is still widespread in 
Aceh. Available data show that the total timber supply from 
natural forests in Aceh annually was around 1.3 million cubic 
* E-mail: jonatan.lassa@gmail.com 
meters (produced by 10 listed concessionaries)- 400 percent 
more than what is locally needed (the local annual demand in 
2008 was 260,000 cubic meters (Blacket and Irianto 2007, 
58)). Of the 2,528 cases of illegal land-use and illegal forest 
management practices in Leuser ecosystem region (Kawasan 
Ekosistim Leuser or K E L -  see Figure 1) distributed in 15 
districts, 56 percent is due to illegal logging and 36 percent 
due to poaching and encroachment. Sawmill, lumber mill, 
timber mill, hunting, road opening, and mining make up the 
remaining causes of land clearance (Leuser International 
Foundation, cited in SIPIL 2008). 
Both illegal logging and encroachment in the KEL were 
facilitated by the road networks that provided easy access to 
the natural forest. The problematic character of road network 
development was raised by the IUCN-UNESCO joint moni- 
toring report for 2006 and 2007 (Hitchcock and Meyers 2006; 
IUCN-UNESCO 2007). The IUCN-UNESCO report noted 
that the construction of new road networks is a key threat to 
the Aceh Rainforest around the KEL. Paradoxically security 
issues during the civil war, between the 1970s and 2005, had 
meant that road networks were not developed. Hence inher- 
ently slower rates of deforestation occurred in this insecure 
era. But the tsunami in 2004 facilitated changes at the politi- 
cal level, including a new peace deal. Infrastructure invest- 
ments poured into the province and hence increased demand 
for forest resources to serve the long-term reconstruction 
projects. 
Another problem in the recent discourse of sustainable 
development of Aceh is the practice of scapegoating small- 
scale farmers and their poverty as the root causes of environ- 
mental degradation, including deforestation. Recently, in the 
Ecosystem Marketplace (www'ec°systemmarketplace'c°m)' 
a land-use assessor from Carbon Conservation stated that: 
"deforestation isn't caused by big companies coming in and 
chopping down trees but the poor people are the root cause of 
deforestation. It's caused by local people having no other 
source of income than the forests." 
This view was challenged by JKMA (Jaringan Komunitas 
Masyarakat Adat or the Aceh Indigenous People's Network), 
which asserted that the neo-liberal market is not a solution for 
Aceh's land-use problems. The Acehnese traditions (Adat), 
with its units of governance such as the Mukims (comparable 
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Figure 1. Ulu Masen and Leuser ecosystems of Aceh 
Source: de Koninck, Bernard, and Girard 2007. 
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with sub-district), are still seen by JKMA as the last defense 
to resist ecological destruction. A d a t  is also considered a tool 
for decelerating the speed of ecological degradation in Aceh. 
Forest conversion is also in conflict with mineral mining 
and palm oil development, which are both part of the provin- 
cial development plans. The total area allowed for mining 
exploration (including land being surveyed) is 455,327 ha or 
nearly 8 percent of total land use in Aceh. Data shows that the 
contribution of the non-oil and gas mining (quarrying) sector 
to the regional GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is trivial (less 
than 1 percent- Source: Aceh Statistical Bureau 2007). 
More than 250,000 ha of palm oil plantations existed in 
Aceh as of 2008. Lack of clear and reliable data presented by 
different actors made the planning of palm oil expansion 
difficult. Palm oil industries at provincial, national, and inter- 
national levels (for example, Malaysia) have a strong interest 
in expanding in Aceh. The creation of the Aceh Plantation 
Development Authority (APDA or in B a h a s a  means Badan  
P e n g e m b a n g a n  Perkebunan  A ceh) - a government body 
modeled on the Malaysian Government's Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA)- is expected to develop an 
additional 350,000 ha of palm oil plantation. 
The key characteristic of the social-political power land- 
scape within the context of LUCF in Aceh is its high level 
of uncertainty. Spatial planning is one area that suffers from 
internal competition within and between different levels of 
governance (central, provincial, and district) and external 
competition with various organizations including local 
reconstruction actors and international donors. 
Volatility of commitment on sustainable development in 
Aceh can be witnessed through the periodical change of 
the provincial administration. A new attempt to establish a 
moratorium logging policy inAceh (simply referred to as "the 
Moratorium") developed by the new provincial government, 
has been praised because of its stronger commitment to 
combat illegal logging followed by a clear follow-up plan for 
future forest planning. The thirteenth Conference of Parties 
(COP 13) in Bali, Indonesia provided a new momentum for 
the provincial government to fine tune its new policy, namely 
the Aceh Green Vision (AVG). The rebranded policy aims to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD) with planned financial support from voluntary 
markets. 
2 Research Questions 
The main objective of this research is to understand the 
power and policy landscape of the LULUCF sector in Aceh 
after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. This includes identi- 
fying the strategic groups and powerful actors who have an 
interest in strategic resources/commodities. This research is 
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based on the following question: how has the power and 
policy landscape in the LULUCF sector been (re)formed 
towards future multi-dimensional sustainability after the 
2004 tsunami? The area focuses for this research is on the Ulu 
Massen and Leuser ecosystems in Aceh (Figure 1). The eco- 
systems have been considered as a potential area for carbon 
management under the reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD) initiatives starting in 2008 in 
Aceh. 
3 Methods of Research 
A literature review of academic and grey literature was 
conducted alongside open ended interviews with key stake- 
holders and participant observation. Interviewees included 
representatives of strategic groups such as civil society activ- 
ists, experts on Aceh LULUCF, government officials (various 
government bureaus) and provincial legislators. The author 
worked in Aceh between 2005 and 2007 as a program coordi- 
nator for a Dutch organization called Hivos, committed for 
civil society organization (CSO) capacity development, 
and became familiar with many of the individual actors and 
organizations crucial to sustainable development in Aceh. 
This enabled access to relevant stakeholders and documents 
as well as participation in a number of Aceh related mailing 
lists. Working in the region also enabled the research to 
benefit from an ethnographic approach and participant 
observation. 
Two focus group discussions (FGDs) were also conducted 
with two local CSOs. The first was with JKMA's key 
activists. The second was an organized workshop with the 
Working Group Besabo Pakat (WGBP) on climate change 
and forestry. Both FGDs were conducted in Banda Aceh 
during July and August 2008. 
4 Conceptual Framework 
In this article, a definition of strategic resource (such as car- 
bon) governance follows the definition of Center for Interna- 
tional Forestry Research (CIFOR), which emphasizes how 
decisions related to carbon and its stakeholders' interests are 
made. Strategic resource governance suggests "...who are 
responsible, how they wield their power, and how they are 
held accountable. It encompasses decision-making processes 
and institutions at local, national, regional and global levels. 
In the context of an increasingly globalised forest sector yet 
also increasingly decentralised system of management, policy 
makers, forest managers and stakeholders face competing 
pressures emanating from both local and global processes" 
(CIFOR 2008). 
Managing natural resources such as forest, land, carbon, 
and palm oil are hypothetically subject to the interests of 
several groups in Aceh today. This includes government 
bureaucrats, palm oil companies, donors/lenders and interna- 
tional organizations, legislators, CSO, ex-combatants, and 
other interested groups. These groups operate through certain 
means such as the building of coalitions, the creation of sym- 
bolic capital, the use of consultancy services in government 
offices, the employment of aid diplomacy, the exploitation 
of time pressure given the rushed nature of post disaster 
intervention, competition for credible data, the engagement 
of social capital, the building of trust, the careful use of dis- 
cretionary power, the encouragement of public participation 
in setting agendas, the sharing of power, and the incorpora- 
tion of populist approaches to natural resource management 
such as equity, legitimacy, the development of indigenous- 
based policies, or the facilitation of collective action of the 
poor and disadvantaged. As previously held elsewhere in 
Indonesia, natural resource management is shaped by institu- 
tions that are characterized by formal institutional arrange- 
ments such as laws, multilevel regulations, and governmental 
acts, in addition to informal institutional arrangement that 
include traditional customs and the Adat system. Both the 
formal and informal management rules experience different 
levels of enforcement to serve sustainable natural resource 
management (McCarthy 2006). This article argues that in 
mapping the power landscape of natural resource manage- 
ment, it is important to look at the existing and emerging 
institutions and organizations that (may) shape and modify 
the state of land-use change and forestry (LUCF) in the 
past, today, and in the future. The author used Llywellyn's 
definition of an organization as "an arena for the 'doing' of 
a multiplicity of projects; where agents may be informed or 
ignorant about the project of others. Also, agential projects 
may conflict or complement, spatially intersect or run in 
parallel and be continuous or disconnected in time" 
(Llywellyn 2007, 134). 
The Strategic Framework for Sustainability Analysis 
(SFSA) tool was developed during a field visit in Aceh in July 
2008. It is considered a suitable method to map the power 
landscape in LULUCF sectors. SFSA is an analytical method 
suitable for a governance analysis of a post-disaster and post- 
conflict context. The SFSA is an extension of strategic group 
analysis in which strategic groups are defined as individuals 
bound by a common interest who protect or extend shared 
outcomes. These interests drive strategic movements so that 
programs can improve gains in the long-term (Evers and 
Shield 1990). "Strategic groups are neither elites nor social 
classes. They cut across hierarchies, its members do not carry 
cards or identification tags, and they may follow different 
lifestyles and follow different beliefs. They are, however, 
united by one common goal: to secure present and future 
chances to gain access to resources; to share chances of 
appropriation of resources and their distribution" (Evers and 
Benedikter 2009, 4). 
Evers and Gerke state that an important condition for the 
formation of strategic groups can be either "a sudden increase 
in the membership of a quasi group" but "not the absolute size 
as such" in which the "members seek an appropriate share of 
wealth and power available in a society" (Evers and Gerke 
2009, 5). The logical implication and relevancy of this 
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analytical theory is that (old and new) strategic groups may 
eventually be strengthen, formed or even dissolved after a 
natural disaster or man-made disaster such as conflict and 
civil war. In fact, strategic groups are not the sum of individu- 
als that form the strategic groups but rather the networks 
of  individuals and organizations with common interest that 
clarify operational strategic frameworks that shape environ- 
mental governance in the aftermath of  large-scale disasters, 
such as the case of  tsunami 2004. 
Therefore, the SFSA can be viewed as a tool for under- 
standing carbon governance through LULUCF. Strategic 
groups are formed when opportunities for new resources are 
created, usually with the development and adoption of  new 
technology (Evers and Shield 1990) or global economic and 
environmental changes, including major disasters such as the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. In Table 1, some existing stra- 
tegic groups are identified while some new potential strategic 
groups are noted as emerging. Strategic groups can be classi- 
fied according to whether economic resources are accessed 
individually, collectively, or cooperatively. Such groups try to 
develop or modify conditions in order to maintain or improve 
the results of  appropriation. To this end, strategic groups 
engage and promote the transformation of  the political system 
in two ways: (1) the hybridization of  expansion into new 
areas in anticipation of  new outcomes; and (2) the stabiliza- 
tion of  the appropriation of  resource outcomes based on the 
monitoring of  the resources themselves (Evers and Shield 
1990). The latter process creates and strengthens new emerg- 
ing class formations. However  this article does not suggest 
that each strategic group comprises fully rational agents. 
Some identified groups have decision-making power based 
on their historical path. Prolonged civil war in Aceh coupled 
with exposure to other risks and poverty as well as the occur- 
rence of  the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 often make it 
difficult for local actors to make strategic decisions in 
advance. "Instead, their strategies unfold as they interact with 
the changes in this dynamic production environment" (Kaag 
et al. 2003, 14). 
Currently, there is an ongoing effort by the government to 
employ qualified bureaucrats for high-level positions at the 
provincial departments/agencies by using a more transparent 
and accountable employment evaluation mechanism. This 
trend provides an improved opportunity for university profes- 
sors to compete with career bureaucrats in accessing high 
level administrative positions. Therefore, academia has now 
become a new strategic group. In a complex situation like 
Aceh, knowledge-based policies are the best option to reduce 
high-level economic, social, cultural, and political uncertain- 
ties (Evers and Gerke 2005). Instead, other strategic groups 
such as CSOs, palm oil companies, international donors, the 
ex-combatants, and traditional leaders will receive particular 
scrutiny. Although it is recognized that academia appears an 
emerging strategic group, it will not be discussed in details 
because of  the time constraint in the field and the research 
design did not anticipate the findings. Furthermore, academia 
is partly represented in the experts' group. However, it is 
worth noting that the increasing roles of  academia and CSOs 
are partly enforced by the present elected political regime that 
originated from both worlds. 
5 Research Findings 
5.1 L o c a l  C S O s  as a S t r a t e g i c  G r o u p  
Aceh CSOs have been severely affected by the IOT 2004. 
International organizations previously considered that Aceh 
CSOs needed support due to a lack of  technical capacity; the 
loss of  human resources after the 2004 tsunami (27 percent 
of  NGO staff were lost in the IOT 2 0 0 4 -  either dead or 
missing); and a lack of  capacity in the local CSOs'  programs i 
(25 percent of  NGOs '  offices and 52 percent of  NGOs staff 
houses were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake and 
tsunami). "Brain drain" is the other problem experienced by 
the local NGOs in Aceh, where at least 20% of  their staff 
have been recruited by international aid organizations (OCHA 
Table 1. Strategic framework for sustainability analysis in Aceh 
Strategic Resources (Emerging) Strategic Groups Strategic Options/Policy 
• Land 
• Forest (Timber) 
• Carbon 
• Palm Oil 
• Knowledge 
• Time 
• Mining Resources 
• Reconstruction Aid 
• Development Funds 
• Government Bureaucrats 
• Malaysian palm oil companies (emerging) 
• Indonesian business groups 
• Civil society organizations 
• Donors/International NGOs 
• Consultants/experts (emerging) 
• University professors 
• Local political parties (emerging) 
• Religious leaders 
• ex-Aceh militias group 
• Aceh Independent Movement (GAM) 
• Parliamentary forums (emerging) 
• Market for ecosystem services 
• Media groups 
• Traditional leaders 
• Alliance building 
• Consultancy services 
• Aid diplomacy (conditionality) 
• Time pressure 
• Myths and facts 
• Data wars 
• Social capital 
• Trust-building 
• Public participation agenda 
• Power-sharing 
• Administrative power 
• Equity and legitimacy 
• Anti-poverty policies 
• Facilitating collective action of the poor 
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and MiSPI 2005). The context for CSOs changed rapidly as 
of 2008. The local CSOs are becoming a very influential 
strategic group in Aceh today as some local CSO activists 
have been able to play advisory roles at local government 
and local/national political parties. Another visible evidence 
is that the present key leaders in Aceh Province such as the 
Governor and Vice-Governor have been long part of CSOs' 
movements in Aceh. Mutual cooperation between local 
watchdog organizations and the media, such as the Associa- 
tion of Independent Journalists, provides a clear indication 
about the importance of CSOs within the public policy arena. 
Local CSOs' influence in LUCF advocacy and monitoring 
has been recognized through community participation and 
they regularly provide constructive input to several forums. 
For example, the Aceh Friends of the Earth (Walhi Aceh) is 
considered a permanent member of the Spatial Planning 
Committee, the Environmental Impact Assessment Commit- 
tee, and the Forestry Redesign team. Within the Aceh context, 
as is also common throughout Indonesia, CSOs have played 
roles in the process of issuing mining permits (generally 
environmental impact assessments) and some pseudo- 
legislative roles such as proactive involvement in drafting 
local laws (qanun in Acehnese). 
The current Aceh administration has to date improved the 
role and position of local CSOs, strongly indicated by the 
major stake held by local CSO activists within the governor's 
technical advisory team. There is an indication of a paradigm 
shift within the current government as well as local NGOs in 
which positive changes have been achieved through dialogue 
(Budi 2008). The Governor and Vice-Governor now openly 
support CSO events such as the recent JKMAAnnual Confer- 
ence conducted in April 2008 and attended by over 800 grass 
root representatives from over 600 Mukims (the traditional 
governance territory at local level practiced during colonial 
time). The JKMA maintains that currently there is a mutually 
beneficial relationship between the government and JKMA 
that allows JKMA to provide direct input or constructive 
criticism of existing policies (Budi 2008). JKMA has openly 
admitted to taking a firm position as a good policy entrepre- 
neur that knows how to properly approach the government. 
Other environmental groups, however, might prefer to keep 
some distance from the government in order to maintain a 
critical perspective as government watchdogs. 
There is also an unwritten division of roles amongst 
various Acehnese CSO forums. The environment and natural 
resource management has been mandated to Walhi Aceh, 
human rights issues are tackled by the Koalisi NGO HAM 
(Coalition of Human Rights NGOs), while more specific 
issues are handled by other NGO forums such as the Aceh 
Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF). In addition to this divi- 
sion of roles amongst local CSOs, other non-governmental 
organizations also play an active role in handling issues 
on natural resource management. Innovative advocacy 
approaches provide insights for future involvement with 
different governmental departments. A good example is the 
organization Eye on Aceh, an advocate on issues relating to 
the palm oil industry. As explained by its principal director, 
the active involvement of Eye on Aceh began by concentrat- 
ing its activities within the Department of Forestry and 
Plantation Aceh. This effort enhanced ownership of the initia- 
tives among the Department staff. It also increased the capac- 
ity and confidence of the Department staff to further strive for 
the sustainability of their programs (Lesley 2008). 
Another innovative advocacy effort is the recent work by 
ACSTF in projecting four scenarios for the development of 
Aceh by 2017. These potential outcomes were developed by 
CSOs through public consultations. The scenarios touched 
on issues of land use, forest management, and flood hazards. 
The ACSTF worked together with CSOs to identify the risks 
of policies chosen for each scenario as well as the ideal devel- 
opment policies that should offer the least risk for Aceh 
(Amiruddin, Achdian, and Ishak 2007). 
The legacy of CSOs advocacy style during the New Order 
totalitarian regime of President Suharto can still be seen in 
Aceh (and elsewhere in Indonesia) in the predictable, accom- 
modating response of CSOs to governmental agencies. 
Such a reactive approach is the result of the various acts of 
repression by the state apparatus during Suharto's New Order 
era. This condition ended with the fall of the regime in 1998. 
But in the context of Aceh, state and especially military 
repression continued until it was partially eradicated in 2005 
with the Helsinki peace accord. In general, innovations 
within the local CSOs are not homegrown and most of the 
local CSOs' existing programs are highly donor-driven. This 
may be justified by the transitional context of Aceh, where 
development shifted from post-tsunami to post-conflict 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. This was acknowledged by 
an activist who viewed that since 2001 local NGOs in Aceh 
had limited control over its own programs. Although there is 
a genuine local response to unsustainable natural resource 
management and other factors that are harmful to the local 
environment, homegrown ideas are still few and even these 
few ideas are challenged by other strategic groups, most 
notably donors and international non-governmental 
organizations (Antariksa 2008). 
Initially, local CSOs responded very slowly to new 
resource management issues, for example those relating to 
carbon and palm oil that are important for strategic move- 
ments. The slowness of their response is mainly due to the 
lack of knowledge on these issues. This was admitted during 
an FGD with the WGBP. Of all the FGD participants, only a 
small minority had a very limited understanding of carbon 
trading and why it is important in Aceh. Most interviewees 
did not have clear answers to questions on how local CSOs 
view carbon management projects in Aceh. CSOs preferred 
to ask about policy mechanisms and impact, such as the 
distribution of benefits to the poor. Some organizations, for 
instance Walhi Aceh, also link carbon trading and other 
policies with the issue of justice between North and South 
countries (Walhi 2007). 
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5.2 Experts as Strategic Groups 
Experts can be a strategic group as their position in policy 
making is crucial. The important roles played by experts for 
the local governments in Aceh in the LULUCF sector can be 
seen from the following example. A spatial planning consul- 
tant, who was scheduled to draft the provincial spatial 
planning guide for Aceh, was killed in the tsunami on 26 
December 2004. Despite the draft being complete and ready 
for presentation on 27 December, this significantly delayed 
the endorsement of the spatial plan. Delays were caused by 
several factors: (1) many changes happened very quickly due 
to the tsunami and rendered the old draft less relevant; (2) the 
2006 draft did not include the new lessons learnt from the 
tsunami that would improve disaster risk management and 
promote improved future hazard/risk analysis; (3) the spatial 
planning document for Aceh was not compatible with the 
national spatial planning requirements or even with the 
spatial planning documents of the rest of Sumatra Island; and 
(4) the draft needed to be made compatible with the recently 
promoted Aceh Green Vision (AGV). To this end, expert 
knowledge was very much needed. 
Formal spatial planning procedures give more weight to 
expert knowledge. The power to define space/spatiality is 
practically in the hands of consultants and experts hired to do 
the job. Their discretionary power is prone to bias either due 
to pressure from certain interests, for example powerful 
groups such as donors and lenders, or due to the so-called 
"knowledge trap" where the data, information, and knowl- 
edge are implemented without any understanding of the 
corresponding unknowns of local context and dynamics 
(Evers, Gerke, and Menkhoff 2006). 
Efforts to organize local experts and consultants through 
an organizational setting, such as IMPACT- a local resource 
pool of experts supported by the United Nations Develop- 
ment Programme (UNDP) are building on the premise that 
local NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) 
also need input from expert knowledge of their own. These 
experts and consultants are not neutral agents. Their proxim- 
ity to their donors/payers or markets may result in the further 
marginalization of already marginal groups. 
5.3 Donors/International NGOs as Strategic Group 
In Aceh today there is still a great deal of tropical rainforest 
with high potential benefit for marketing ecosystem services. 
Therefore, donors and international conservation NGOs 
may have strong interests in having access to the forest 
management as well as LULUCF based resource manage- 
ment. International donors (such as the World Bank and other 
development banks) may function as a new strategic group 
that serves their own interest. There are strong indications 
that big aggressive lenders and donors shape international 
investment plans that are in fact moving away from environ- 
mentally responsible and sustainable development policies. 
For example, initial support from international financial 
institutions for the new highway network in the highland 
route will cut across the protected forest situated in both Ulu 
Masen and Leuser ecosystems. Concerns over such support 
were expressed very strongly in the 2006 and 2007 UNESCO 
World Forest Heritage monitoring reports (UNESCO 2006, 
2007). 
There are also concerns about how donors influenced 
government decision-making processes due to a lack of trans- 
parency. Field work indicates that local CSOs such as Walhi 
Aceh and JKMA viewed all development banks as aggressive 
lenders because at least one of the lenders uses the transi- 
tional context of Aceh as a means to increase its lending 
performance (Budi 2008; Antariksa 2008). The CSOs cannot 
ascertain how much influence development banks have on the 
Government of Aceh because there is no locally accessible 
data on the size of the loans provided to the local government 
in the post-tsunami setting. 
Another concern raised during interviews was the strategic 
action made by donors and international NGOs through 
placement of experts in certain governmental bodies. These 
experts and consultants may be biased in favor of the donor's 
interests. It is commonly believed locally that there are 
strong collaborations between donors (often using experts 
or consultants) in an effort to become involved in drafting 
environmental legislation. This process often goes unnoticed 
and suffers from a lack of transparency. Often the public 
does not know how different stakeholders' interests are being 
exercised. This involves other strategic groups - the so-called 
lobbyist groups - especially at the national level. These aid 
elites are involved in policy drafting (characterized by high 
level meetings) in which documents are first drafted in 
English, then (if a larger community is lucky) they are trans- 
lated into Bahasa Indonesian, and then, if possible, into the 
local language-  depending on whether the donors believe 
locals need to be informed. 
If Thorburn's analysis that donors are the least trusted at 
the village level is correct (Thorburn 2008), then a similar 
trend may also be occurring at the elite level, which requires 
further research. Local CSOs are already providing alterna- 
tives in order to break through this lack of transparency and 
participation in development programs. The birth of local 
grant-making organizations such as the Aceh Development 
Fund (http://adfaceh.org) and Aceh People Forum (http://apf. 
or.id) signaled the growing role of local donors that may be 
more open and supportive to local initiatives. 
One of the pitfalls regarding the decentralization process 
in Indonesia is that the local governments are allowed to deal 
directly with international lenders. These large-scale lenders 
always use local spatial planning as a basis to push forward 
their own interests and agendas. For example, even before the 
formal process to endorse the new spatial plans for Aceh were 
drafted by Bappeda Aceh (Regional Body of Planning 
and Development) , one international lender had already 
approved a new loan for the construction of the Jantho- 
Takengon highway to be included in the 2008 fiscal year. 
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5.4 Traditional Leaders 
Despite the large amount of resources invested by donors and 
international NGOs in the reconstruction process, a recent 
survey of 530 households by Thorburn (2008) in 18 villages 
indicated that village communities perceive NGOs and donor 
facilitators as the least trusted actors among those in a posi- 
tion to lead. This did not mean that the most-trusted leaders at 
the village level, the keuchik or village head and informal 
leaders composing the Tuha Peuet (permanent council of 
elders) encouraged participatory decision-making processes. 
One finding from Thorburn's survey showed that in the 
majority of the surveyed villages, community members seek 
to solve their problems through participative informal com- 
munity mechanisms such as village meetings and institutions, 
or smaller groupings of family and neighbors. 
The reemergence of religious groups (Ulama) and their 
roles in environment and natural resource management has 
been understudied. The Ulama's Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama or MPU) has gained their 
power through local law (qanun) No. 9/2003, which regulates 
the relationship between MPU as the highest religious institu- 
tion and the executive government and legislative institutions. 
This qanun has made MPU Aceh's form of governance 
different from the rest of the indonesian provinces as it 
has recognized an additional agency to the existing local 
division of powers between executive, legislative, and judi- 
cial institutions. However, Figure 2 gives a different story as, 
in fact, there are more actors involved in the environmental 
management business. 
Amid the resurrection of the Adat at the policy leveP ~ as a 
new manager of strategic natural resources such as land use 
and forest (Syarif 2003, 2008), the current local government 
is under pressure from various forces such as markets, 
international donors, and other strategic groups. Mukim is an 
administrative unit of Adat. The Mukim is still construed as an 
informal structure in both works of foreign scholars and local 
NGOs (Fitzpatrick 2007; McCarthy 2005; Thorburn 2008). 
At a community meeting in Bener Meriah in 2006, some 
participants argued for the need to revitalize the Mukim as a 
formal player in the governance structure with clear rights to 
land use and natural resource management (Harley 2008, 
229). The Mukim discourse is one way to respond to the 
uncertainties in dealing with forest and land-use problems 
that occur when existing formal institutions become involved. 
in responding to the uncertainties in natural resource manage- 
ment at the local level, local CBOs with strong influence at 
the Mukim level (such as JKMA) currently hold the view that 
Mukim-based natural resource management is the last defense 
to decelerate ecological destruction and degradation. As a 
result, the reputation of Adat as an influential conservation 
regime has increased (McCarthy 2006). 
5.5 Bureaucrats Going Green? 
The so-called "green policy" was expected to solve many 
environmental and natural resource management problems. It 
has been promoted in Aceh since 2005 iii, before the current 
governor invested time and effort to develop a "richer" Aceh 
Green Vision, with the help of knowledge services (experts or 
consultants) provided by donors. Therefore, some existing 
environmental policies are already in place, such as the obli- 
gation to conduct Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
for forest-based projects and palm oil plantation develop- 
ment. But these early environmental regulations are widely 
considered to be useless. During a discussion with the head of 
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the Environmental Impact Agency for the Aceh Province 
(Bapedal) in 2008, it was mentioned that the activities of 
Bapedal are all about "being green." Reality is considerably 
different, because the office is weakened by a very low 
annual budget, poor human resources, and other problems 
and cannot function properly. In the Bapedal annual report, 
The State of the Regional Environmental Status of 2007 (Aceh 
Environmental Agency 2007) for the province of Aceh, there 
is a clear indication that basic requirements for it to function 
are not fully met. Legislators are blamed for not prioritizing 
support for Bapedal's environmental monitoring activities, 
since Bapedal has the mandate to enforce the law when envi- 
ronmental crime occurs. Walhi Aceh has previously tried 
to push the legislature and Bappeda to increase the annual 
budget for Bapedal to function properly. 
The discourse on the green movement within and between 
the departments of the Government of Aceh has progressed 
as evidenced by the Aceh Green Conferences in 2005, 2007 
and 2008. The possibility of bureaucrats leading the green 
movement through law enforcement and better implementa- 
tion of environmental policy in Aceh can only be realized if 
the other strategic groups such as donors, CSOs, and experts 
work together. Rather than reinventing the wheel and creating 
more ad hoc institutions and organizations, support is 
needed to implement existing environmental protection 
mechanisms. 
5.6. Palm Oil Companies 
The common feature of all the strategic groups in the LUCF 
sector in Aceh is the promotion of an anti-poverty agenda. 
For instance, FELDA (Federal Land and Development 
Authority), the world's largest fully integrated palm oil-based 
group, with 92 factories in Malaysia (Eye on Ache 2007) 
currently enjoys the attention and trust from the Government 
of Aceh and is looking for land to open new palm oil planta- 
tions. It is now involved in the Government of Aceh's palm 
oil for the orphans program, designed to assist around 100,000 
children orphaned by the conflict through the future benefit of 
palm oil production (SIPIL 2008). 
Investors in the palm oil sector have to protect their repu- 
tational image. Currently, some companies are proposing to 
clear land for palm oil plantation in Aceh. These companies 
include PT Astra Agro Lestari (Indonesian-owned, requesting 
200,000 ha), YPEIM (Yayasan Pengembangan Economy 
Islam Malaysia; Malaysian-owned, requesting 185,000 ha), 
FELDA (Malaysian-owned, requesting 45,000 ha), and other 
large companies from Indonesia. This demand cannot be met 
due to the lack of available land. In the current palm oil nego- 
tiations with the Government of Aceh, Malaysian companies 
seem to be welcome (especially by several groups in Aceh) 
mainly due to their ability to take advantage of the social, 
historical, and cultural ties between Aceh and Malaysia. 
Islamic values, such as caring for orphans and the poor, are 
often used in the local newspapers to promote the idea that 
cooperation between the government and these companies is 
socially responsible. Social, historical, and cultural ties are 
also used in the recent loans and debt negotiations. In 
addition, FELDA and YPEIM are much more involved and 
proactive in providing inputs for the drafting of plantation 
and land-related regulations. At least on the surface, the 
Malaysian companies have more comparative and competi- 
tive advantages in terms of lobbying power than their 
competitors in dealing with the palm oil business in Aceh. 
The business groups engaged in palm oil production are 
growing in terms of the number and size of their plantations, 
making them a strategic group that is pragmatic and united in 
their pursuit of profit. Such business interests will inevitably 
collide with existing government regulations that supposedly 
protect the environment. The involvement of legislatures and 
executives in changing the status of forests from protected 
into industrial is one such example -  this in fact creates 
a problem for carbon conservation because some natural 
carbon sequestration is in danger due to regulations that 
allow the palm oil industry to operate in peat swamp forests. 
Consequently, the drained swamp forests are prone to forest 
fire, thus emitting more carbon. There is a need to encourage 
and increase cooperation between the Forestry and Planta- 
tions Department with CSOs, international NGOs and 
donors ready to anticipate and deal with clashes between 
environmental sustainability and business interests. Such 
cooperation has begun recently in an effort to institutionalize 
internationally-recognized regulatory mechanisms such as 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) iV. 
6 Collision and Coalition of Strategic 
Groups 
Policy change related to sustainable forest governance must 
take into consideration collisions and coalitions between 
various strategic groups. A perception survey conducted 
among 199 CSOs activists in 21 districts may be used as a 
preliminary indicator to compare some strategic groups that 
were mapped out in Figure 3 (Nababan and Demos 2007). 
The district government staff has always operated within 
sets of laws, regulations, and administrative arrangements 
that are ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations 
(McCarty 2006). This has created opportunities for corrupted 
environmental management to pick and choose laws or 
regulations that justify their new policies. These bureaucrats 
(from all levels) are good examples of strategic groups that 
have colluded with other strategic groups such as the logging 
and palm oil companies. Furthermore, they can select particu- 
lar laws/regulations that allow them to facilitate revenue and 
capital accumulation for certain bureaucratic groups at the 
district level (McCarty 2006). In contrast, press and media 
still function as the main channel for local views and com- 
plaints. Legal enforcement officers were also mentioned as 
the persons to go to for complaints. The long-standing part- 
nership between mass media (especially the Aceh Association 
of Independent Journalists - AAJI) and the local corruption 
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Figure 3. Where people send their complaints 
Source: Modified from Demos' dataset 30 April 2007 (Nababan and Demos 2007). 
and environmental watchdogs should be seen as another 
coalition between strategic groups. 
Although the ex-military members of Aceh Independent 
Movement v and local political parties are not discussed in this 
paper, however, their significance as a strategic group must 
also be considered. Their potential to influence environmen- 
tal problems and agrarian conflict may also contribute to the 
(un)sustainable development of Aceh. Collision and coalition 
between the strategic groups require further in-depth studies. 
7 Sustainability and Strategic Groups 
What is strategic to the groups may conflict with the sustain- 
able use of natural resource. Strategic action from every 
stakeholder group in regards to the sustainable management 
of land use and forest, or sustainable development in general, 
must be measured within the criteria for sustainability. Some 
existing environmental and resource management policies 
can now be tested against these criteria. What was originally 
claimed as important for the sustainable use of natural 
resource management and the sustainable livelihoods of poor 
people will often not turn out as many stakeholders claim. 
The AGV may raise more questions and doubts than 
provide answers. Based on several interviews with local 
government officials, legislative members, and national and 
local NGOs including CBOs and Women's organizations, 
some concerned responses can be drawn. First, in terms of a 
policy making process, AGV is seen as a secret trading busi- 
ness where only the distant brokers have all the necessary 
information. Second, the approach was seen by CSOs as 
a secret trading type of policy creation that will increase 
transaction cost because it decreases trust, discourages early 
inputs, and delays early warnings of problems. Finally, such 
an approach does not use existing resources and capacities, 
which creates an atmosphere of favouritism rather than 
common ownership. 
Therefore, although the term green in the AGV conveys 
the meaning of sustainability, in practice, early efforts to 
formulate AGV seem to have a tenuous commitment on the 
principles of sustainability. As noted earlier, it is probably 
inappropriate to view the AGV as merely a vision. Anecdotal 
information suggests that the supporters of the vision are 
not from the insiders (government officials such as Bappeda 
employees and sectoral provincial department officials) as 
might be anticipated, but merely outsiders drawn from donor 
organizations and consultants. 
In mid-2008, Bappeda (the Aceh Development Planning 
Board) officially presented a draft of spatial planning at the 
Spatial Planning Meeting for Sumatra Island. It was quite 
surprising that the formal representative of Bappeda did not 
say anything about AGV. Finally, one of the government 
Lassa. Strategic Group Formation for Carbon Governance in Indonesia after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 37 
forestry experts took the initiative to share "the vision", 
which apparently was not shared by the Bappeda senior 
management staff presented at the meeting. 
Some good practices can be derived from the advocacy 
model introduced by Eye on Aceh through their activities in 
the palm oil sector. As explained by the Director of Eye on 
Aceh, their effort started by embedding their initiative within 
the Department of Forestry and Plantation in Aceh (Lesley 
2008). They considered this vital not only to build ownership 
of the initiatives, but also to increase the capacity and the 
confidence of the Department's staff (Lesley 2008). 
Enforcement by forest paramilitary Polisi Hutan (hereaf- 
ter Polhut) Vi may (and may not) make a significant contribu- 
tion to the Moratorium. However, the history of forest 
management in Aceh is not encouraging. When the Leuser 
Management Unit (LMU) was formed in the mid-1990s to 
manage the Leuser ecosystem in the Sumatra rainforest, it 
created a new zoning system that was enforced by intensified 
paramilitary law enforcement. This effort failed (McCarthy 
2006). Overreliance on a target figure of 3,000 newly recruited 
Polhut officers for enforcement can create unforeseen costs 
and risks that are invisible to decision makers. 
Based on interviews with key local CSOs and also during 
a workshop with WGBP, it is clear that participation of the 
REDD policy has been low. Thorburn (2008) believes that 
trust remained low due to the long term conflict in the region. 
Furthermore, the initiators of the project did not seriously 
invest in trust building, which requires adequate consultation 
processes between the locals and the elites (Thorburn 2008). 
The Women Volunteers for Humanity (RPUK) stressed that 
the project managers justified limited local participation on 
the premise that local knowledge of carbon management- 
related issues was low. This elitist attitude is inexcusable 
(Khairani 2008). There is simply no guarantee that local 
people (even at the elite level such as local CSOs) will sup- 
port the management of a new carbon fund resource if they 
cannot see any benefit for themselves. The risk of the forest- 
use moratorium to the poor, whose lands are not certified, 
indicate that the policy was constructed without adequately 
consulting with the grass root community. "Logging is 
permitted for trees only on people's agricultural/certified 
land" (Blackett and Irianto 2007, 23). Cases exist where 
people were criminalized due to logging on their own 
uncertified land (Modus Aceh 2009). The concept of land 
certification is rooted in the private property regime, while 
land ownership in Aceh is managed partly by informal/Adat 
mechanisms. Lessons learned from other parts of the world, 
such as in Mexico, demonstrate that carbon management 
through voluntary market does not necessarily benefit the 
direct resource guardians and users (Corbera, Kosoy, and 
Martmez 2007; Corbera, Brown, and Adger 2007). Currently, 
the concern over illegal logging seems to be limited to how to 
spend the district government budget by inserting question- 
able items into the budget, such as the purchase arms (pre- 
sumably for the Polhut or Forest Rangers) and the acquisition 
of Closed-circuit television (Blakckett and Irianto 2007). The 
recruitment of Polhut itself seems to ignore the complexities 
of the illegal logging networks. Since before the conflict, 
there has always been a logging network that extended from 
the village to the central government level. As an early 
example, in 1995, Aceh Selatan has 5 operational sawmills 
(all without small-scale logging licenses) and one of which 
was owned by the local government's business company 
(McCarthy 2006). 
Community based monitoring systems are still not consid- 
ered seriously and should be encouraged. The lack of partici- 
pation in the moratorium could increase the transaction costs. 
Existing CSOs have already empowered local watchdog 
networks (Mukim base and Adat base), which can be consid- 
ered as a limited monitoring mechanism that could be further 
capitalized (Syarif 2003, 2008). This preliminary arrange- 
ment shows the importance of participation in enforcing the 
moratorium that is currently lacking. 
8 Final Discussion 
Understanding the strategic groups in post disaster settings is 
important for multi-dimension sustainability. In the case of 
Aceh, the IOT 2004 has shaped a context where different (and 
old) strategic groups (such as the different groups of combat- 
ants) were able to develop a peace deal. The disaster has 
opened up new opportunities that were unthinkable prior to 
IOT 2004, such as carbon resource management. An analysis 
of the emergence of new strategic groups in the power land- 
scape of environmental governance is therefore needed in 
order to understand how sustainability is shaped and reshaped 
after a large-scale disaster such as the 2004 tsunami. This 
means that the use of Strategic Framework for Sustainability 
Analysis (SFSA) is relevant and can be an option for future 
environmental governance research such as REDD and cli- 
mate mitigation in a disaster context but also beyond disaster 
context. However, more research is needed for the improve- 
ment. 
Looking at the process of carbon management policy 
today in Aceh, there are risks of the "knowledge trap" due to 
the ignorance or dismissal of factors that support sustainabil- 
ity, specifically, the principles of participation and legitimacy 
(Adger et al. 2002). It is arguably inappropriate to downplay 
the carbon management policy (such as AGV) as merely 
a vision because it may still evolve into a new regime of 
spatial planning and land-use management. There is anec- 
dotal information that the circle that promotes carbon 
management policy is not dominated by the official local 
stakeholders of government officials such as Bappeda, and 
sectoral provincial departments but by donors and expatriate 
experts (Lesley 2008). Early identification of the supporters 
of the AGV provided clues to the emergence of new powerful 
groups that will form in the future, including the supporters 
of and the opposition to AGV. It is crucial to understand the 
dynamics of power and interests of the local stakeholders 
(McCarthy 2000) in the present carbon governance in Aceh. 
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Previous account on strategic groups' influence on Aceh 
Rainforest suggests that student group and CSOs have 
maintained their positive influence as pressure groups that 
watch the forest user groups (McCarthy 2002). 
Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer (2005) discuss a simple yet dif- 
ficult question: When and how far is group formation a route 
out of chronic poverty? This is a rhetorical question in that the 
poor have many difficulties in forming groups. "Successful 
groups formed among the poor often exclude the poorest, 
particularly those associated with market functions. It is the 
political function of groups that is of primary importance 
in helping to overcome marginalization and social exclusion 
experienced by the poorest" (Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer 2005, 
907). 
Overall, in order to minimize the high level of uncertainty 
in Aceh, every policy in managing strategic resources (palm 
oil, carbon, biodiversity) that has strong links with the other 
strategic resources (forest, land) requires certain democratic 
processes that should not be compromised. The actions of 
many strategic groups are not based on the interest in or a 
commitment to sustainability. Therefore, every policy should 
be confronted with the principles of sustainability in order to 
ensure that the outcomes of strategic resource management 
are equitable. 
The designing of LUCF management policy and its 
message delivery should recognize the equity pattern of all 
stakeholders. Spatial distribution of flood risk due to forest 
loss probably follows patterns of economic inequality. While 
the benefits are enjoyed by a small minority, those who are 
exposed to the risk of LUCF mismanagement constitute the 
majority of the local population. Carbon management policy 
is often based on high-level decisions from government offi- 
cials and donors, excluding grass roots priorities and public 
participation. In a country where public perceptions are not 
known to the government, LUCF policy is legitimately made, 
but also often masked, by affirmative action for the protection 
of the forest and land. 
However, the risk of using strategic group analysis is that 
the very poorest or simply the poor are not adequately repre- 
sented in the existing strategic groups. However, the inclusion 
of the grass roots as a strategic group is possible as previous 
study from Thailand showed that networks of poor farmers 
can transform themselves into a strategic group, which made 
possible resistance and alternatives to powerful strategic 
groups such as the coalition between forest corporate and 
military business (Pye 2005). This should be an important 
question among scholars in development, disaster and hazard, 
and environmental governance studies for future research. 
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Notes 
i Based on documents of some international development and relief 
organizations such as UNDR http:llwww.undp.or.id/pubs/docs/ 
AcehNiasNews-June08.pdf. 
ii See formal regulations such as Perda Number 7 Year 2000; Qanun 
Number 4 Year 2003 on Mukim; and Qanun Number 5 Year 2003 on 
Gampong. 
iii Officials inside the government such as Dinas Marine and Fisheries, 
Dinas Bapedal, Bappeda, and DPRA, (legislative) during off the 
record discussions strongly assert that the origin of the very idea 
of green policy has been born since 2005 and maintain that this is 
proven by formal publication by the previous governor. 
iv RSPO is a multi-stakeholder platform. The members are palm oil 
producers, traders, processors, consumer goods manufacturers, 
retailers, banks, environmental NGOs, and social NGOs. The group 
aims to promote the production, procurement, and use of sustainable 
palm oil. 
v It is previously known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM); Now it is 
named Aceh Transitional Committee. 
vi Polisi Hutan can be loosely translated as forest police or forest guards. 
The term is softened when translated as forest facilitators in the 
Concept Notes of AGV, July 2008 (final draft). 
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